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One-way functions are widely used for encrypting the secret in public key cryptography, although they 
are regarded as plausibly one-way but have not been proven so. 
Here we discuss the public key cryptosystem based on the system of higher order Diophantine equations. 
In this system those Diophantine equations are used as public keys for sender and recipient, and both 
sender and recipient can obtain the shared secret through a trapdoor, while attackers must solve those 
Diophantine equations without trapdoor. Thus the scheme of this cryptosystem might be considered to 
represent a possible one-way function. 
We also discuss the problem on implementation, which is caused from additional complexity necessary 
for constructing Diophantine equations in order to prevent from attacking by tamperers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Since the public-key cryptography introduced by Diffie and Hellman,[1] various public-
key cryptosystems based on integer factorization or discrete logarithm such as RSA, El Gamal, 
or those using elliptic curve techniques have been developed.[2] They obtain the computational 
security by using the sufficiently large key which imposes the attackers too heavy 
computational cost to decipher through solving integer factorization or discrete logarithm 
problems. Although no polynomial-time method for factoring large integers or solving the 
discrete logarithm problem has been known, it has not been proven that there exist no 
polynomial-time solutions for those problems.[3] Therefore the cryptosystems which are 
proven that there is no polynomial-time solution for attackers are thought to be significantly 
secure against their attacks. 
 Here a new cryptosystem is discussed. In this cryptosystem the public key for recipient is 
expressed with Diophantine equation and his/her private key is expressed with a value on the 
quotient ring defined with another Diophantine equation.  
 A Diophantine equation has plural unknown variables and defines an algebraic curve or 
algebraic surface. It is know to find the lattice points as the solutions of Diophantine equation is 
difficult in general when the order of that Diophantine equation is higher than one.[7] This 
difficulty is derived from that the equation may have no nontrivial solution, a finite number or 
an infinite number of solutions. Regarding its solvability, there is no general method to 
determine by a finite number of operations whether the equation is solvable or not.[8] However 
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these properties of Diophantine equation are also useful for encrypting message to keep it secret 
and have been applied to some public key cryptosystems.[9][10] For example, the cryptosystem 
proposed by Lin, et al. is based on that the Diophantine equation dealt with in the system is 
practically non-soluble.[11] Precisely saying, the practically non-soluble Diophantine equation 
mentioned here indicates that there is no algorithm for solving it running in polynomial time. 
However it has been revealed that some alternative methods such as using AI[12], A* 
search[13] or genetic algorithm[14] are effective for solving numerically some specific types of 
Diophantine equation. It implies the cryptosystem built on a certain type of Diophantine 
equation might be broken within polynomial time by using those methods.    
 On the other hand, on the cryptosystem proposed here both sender and recipient can 
choose the form of Diophantine equation arbitrary. Therefore they can avoid the use of the 
specific types of Diophantine equation which are vulnerable to the methods mentioned above. 
The Diophantine equation used for recipient's public key is given by sender who has the 
trapdoor which is explained later and he/she can recovers the shared secret with that trapdoor, 
while attackers who have obtained the Diophantine equations as public keys for sender and 
recipient must solve them without the trapdoor. Thus this cryptosystem is expected to have the 
computational security stemmed from the difficulty of Diophantine problem.  
 In the following sections we discuss the basic idea for that cryptosystem, practical scheme 
and hardness of decryption by attackers. Also positive and negative aspects comparing with 
other cryptosystems are discussed. 
2. KEY EXCHANGE SCHEME 
 Firstly we discuss the basic idea on this key exchange scheme using examples. To simplify 
the discussion we use simpler Diophantine equations and quotient ring in the following 
examples than those used in practical cases. 
This key exchange scheme begins from the recipient side. The recipient sets the integer values 
of variables, say, x, y as x = 2, y = 3. Using those variables the recipient constructs a 
Diophantine equation such as, 
   x
3
 – y2 + 1 = 0        
 1) 
The recipient sends the information of that Diophantine equation to sender with keeping the 
values of x and y secret. The above Diophantine equation (1) is the public key and x, y are the 
private keys for recipient. 
 Sender constructs the polynomial as Diophantine equation on the quotient ring Z[X,Y] / 
(X3 – Y2 + 1) through the following procedures; Firstly the sender defines the following 
operator on that quotient ring. 
   T[a,b;c]   :  x → (x + a) c  + b      
 2) 
where a, b are integers and c is odd (c > 0). The inverse operator for it is given as,  
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   T[a,b;c] -1  :  y → (y – b)1/c  – a      
 3) 
Sender then sets an element on the quotient ring, say xy2, and applies the operator (2) 
repeatedly to that element as, 
   T[a1,b1;c1] (T[a2,b2;c2] (...(T[an,bn;cn] (xy2))...) = T[a1,b1;c1] T[a2,b2;c2] ... T[an,bn;cn] 
(xy2)    
            = h(x,y)         
 4) 
where h(x,y) is an element in Z[X,Y] / (X3 – Y2 + 1). For example, 
   T[1,2;3] T[0,3;1] (xy2) = T[1,2;3] (xy2 + 3) 
            = (xy2 + 4)3 + 2 = x3y6 + 12x2y4 + 48xy2 + 66    
 5) 
Sender keeps the parameters in the operators (i.e. 1, 2, 3 and 0, 3, 1 in T[1,2;3] and T[0,3;1] ) secret. 
Those parameters are the private keys for sender and actually form a "trapdoor". x3y6 + 12x2y4 + 
48xy2 + 66 is expressed with various ways in Z[X,Y] / (X3 – Y2 + 1). Sender chooses one of 
those representations, say, (y2 – 1) y6 + 12x2y4 + 48xy2 + 66  = y8 – y6 + 12x2y4 + 48xy2 + 66 and 
sends it with xy2 to the recipient. The form of polynomial y8 – y6 + 12x2y4 + 48xy2 + 66 is the 
public key for sender. 
 Recipient calculates y8 – y6 + 12x2y4 + 48xy2 + 66 and xy2 using his/her private keys x = 2, 
y = 3 as, 
   y8 – y6 + 12x2y4 + 48xy2 + 66 = 10650    
 6) 
   xy2  = 18        
 7) 
and returns the value 10650 to sender with keeping xy2  = 18 secret. The Diophantine equation 
(6) is another public key for recipient, and the value of xy2  is actually the shared secret between 
sender and recipient as shown below; Sender calculates xy2  using the inverse operators as, 
   T[0,3:1] -1 T[1,2:3] -1 (10650) = T[0,3:1] -1 ((10650 – 2)1/3 – 1)  
            = T[0,3:1] -1 (21) = (21 – 3) – 0 = 18     
 8) 
and sender could recover the value of xy2 as 18.  
 Attackers who have had the public keys for both sender and recipient must solve the 
following system of equations to obtain the value of xy2. 
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   x
3
 – y2 + 1 = 0        
 9) 
   y8 – y6 + 12x2y4 + 48xy2 + 66 = 10650    
 10) 
Since the above system is zero-dimensional, the attackers can solve it numerically or using 
Groebner basis.[5] However when the number of variables are greater than two, or the system 
is positive-dimensional, solving it is difficult in general.[6] 
 Based on the above discussion, we construct the general scheme for the key exchange 
cryptosystem. 
Step 1 
Recipient sets the integer values of variables x1, x2, ... , xm as,  
   x1 = k1, x2 = k2, ... , xm = km   (kj : integers)   
 11) 
and constructs Diophantine equation as recipient's public key using those variables as, 
   f(x1, x2, ... , xm) = 0       
 12) 
Recipient keeps k1, k2, ... , km secret.  
Step 2 
Recipient sends the above Diophantine equation (12) to sender.   
Step 3 
Sender sets an element g(x1, x2, ... , xm) in the quotient ring Z[X1, X2, ... , Xm] / (f(X1, X2, ... , 
Xm)) and defines the operators T[aj,bj:cj]   (j = 1, ... , n) on that quotient ring as, 




where aj, bj are integers and cj is odd (cj > 0). Then the sender applies those operators to g(x1, 
x2, ... , xm) as, 
   T[a1,b1:c1] (T[a2,b2:c2] ( ... (T[an,bn:cn] (g(x1, x2, ... , xm))) ... ) 
            = T[a1,b1:c1] T[a2,b2:c2] ... T[an,bn:cn] (g(x1, x2, ... , xm))  
            = h(x1, x2, ... , xm)       
 14) 
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where h(x1, x2, ... , xm) is an element in Z[X1, X2, ... , Xm] / (f(X1, X2, ... , Xm)) and has generally 
various representations. Sender chooses one of them as his/her public key. 
Step 4 
Sender sends the public key h(x1, x2, ... , xm) chosen in the previous step with the form g(x1, x2, 
... , xm) to recipient.  
Step 5 
Recipient calculates h(x1, x2, ... , xm) = p and g(x1, x2, ... , xm) = s using (11) where p and s are 
some integers.  
Step 6 
Recipient sends back the value p to sender with keeping the value s secret.  
Step 7 
Sender recovers the value s of g(x1, x2, ... , xm) as, 
   s = T[an,bn:cn] -1  T[an-1,bn-1:cn-1] -1 ... T[a1,b1:c1] -1 (p)   
  15) 
Thus sender and recipient could share the secret s. 
 The parameter c in the operator T[a,b:c] must be odd, otherwise the image of inverse 
operator; 
   T[a,b;c] -1  : y → (y – b)1/c  – a      
 16) 
may not be determined uniquely and it causes the ambiguity on the obtained secret s.  
 It is possible to modify the above scheme to that on finite ring. In that case the 
Diophantine equation (12) is modified to a congruence equation with modulus w and the 
quotient ring is rewritten as, 
   Zw [X1, X2, ... , Xm] / (f(X1, X2, ... , Xm))    
 17) 
where Zw is the quotient ring composed of 0, 1, ... , w-1. The operator defined in Step 3 is 
modified as, 
   T[a,b:c] : x → (x + a) c + b       mod w     
 
18) 
and its inverse operator is expressed as, 
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   T[a,b;c] -1  : y → (y – b) c'   – a     mod w    
  19) 
where cc' = 1 mod ϕ(w) (ϕ(w): Euler's totient function). 
3. HARDNESS OF DECRYPTION FOR ATTACKERS 
 Attackers who have had the public information of sender and recipient are to solve the 
following system of two Diophantine equations; 
    f(x1, x2, ... , xm) = 0   ... in Step 1    
 20) 
    h(x1, x2, ... , xm) = p   ... in Step 5    
 21) 
and estimate the secret s = g(x1, x2, ... , xm) with the obtained solution. As mentioned in earlier 
section, it is difficult to solve (20) and (21) in integers when m is greater than two in general. 
  As another strategy, attackers may consider to decipher the sequence of operators appeared 
in Step 3; 
   T[a1,b1:c1] T[a2,b2:c2] ... T[an,bn:cn] (g(x1, x2, ... , xm)) = h(x1, x2, ... , xm) 
 22) 
by using (20) and (21). Once the above sequence has been deciphered, attackers can estimate 
the secret s = g(x1, x2, ... , xm) applying the inverse sequence of the above sequence. However 
the highest order among x1, x2, ... , xm in h(x1, x2, ... , xm) becomes greater in general along with 
the increase of the iteration number n expressed in (22). Since the greater the highest order is, 
the more equivalent expressions in the quotient ring  Z[X1, X2, ... , Xm] / (f(X1, X2, ... , Xm)) are,  
it is also virtually impossible to decipher the sequence of operators (22) unless attackers have 
known the iteration number n previously or the Diophantine equation (12) is linear. 
 When the system of higher order congruence equations are used for the scheme instead of 
Diophantine equations (20) and (21) as mentioned in earlier section, the size of secret key is 
generally determined by that of modulus w. Although the solution space for the system of 
congruence equations is finite, obtaining the secret s is still difficult for attackers because in 
general the problem to solve such system of higher order congruence equations is NP-complete 
when m > 2.[4] 
4. PRO AND CON 
 Attackers must solve the system of Diophantine equations to estimate the shared secret 
between sender and recipient. Generally it is hard to solve that system when it is positive-
dimensional. Attackers also subject the similar constraint on the corresponding higher order 
congruence equation system. That feature brings the proven security which does not depend on 
the performance of attackers' computational capacity. Namely sender and recipient can choose 
the public keys which have the length shorter than that of public keys used for other 
cryptosystems without harming the security, and the shorter length of public keys would 
alleviate the computational load considerably.  
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 Comparing with other key exchange cryptosystem such as RSA or Diffie-Hellman scheme, 
this cryptosystem needs additional key exchange step, that is, recipient must tell a Diophantine 
equation from which the quotient ring is constructed to sender prior to key exchange between 
them. It may increase the vulnerability regarding the security on this key exchange 
cryptosystem. 
 Sender and recipient exchange Diophantine equations as their public keys. Although 
sender and recipient can choose their Diophantine equations arbitrary, some specific 
considerations are required to construct those Diophantine equations practically in the actual 
key exchange scheme as discussed below. 
 Firstly in Step 1 described in the section: Key exchange scheme, the Diophantine equation 
(12) must be constructed carefully to avoid the case that it has unique solution, otherwise as 
soon as solving that equation, attackers get the secret keys expressed in (11). Next in Step 3, the 
Diophantine equation (14) must not have unique solution as well as (12), also it must be 
complicated enough to prevent from inferring the sequence of operators used for constructing 
(14) by attackers. It is not practical that the above Diophantine equations are constructed 
manually by sender and recipient in general cases, and it will be necessary to implement 
appropriate programs into that cryptosystem to generate those equations automatically based on 
the values of variables x1, x2, ... , xm set in Step 1, and aj, bj, cj and n set in Step 3. To prevent 
from breaking the patterns of generating them by attackers, the forms of Diophantine equations 
determined by those programs must not be static, but dynamically change according with the 
input, or randomly. Thus the implementation of this cryptosystem will impose additional 
calculation load for them with that for dealing with the Diophantine equations symbolically. 
5. SUMMARY 
 In the proposed key exchange cryptosystem the system of two higher order Diophantine 
equations is considered for encrypting shared secret between sender and recipient. 
 The first Diophantine equation is created by recipient and sender creates another 
Diophantine equation on the quotient ring based on the first Diophantine equation. The shared 
secret has the form of polynomial and both sender and recipient can obtain its value by a 
trapdoor without solving the system of those Diophantine equations explicitly. 
 On the other hand, attackers must solve the following system of two Diophantine 
equations mentioned above in order to obtain the secret.  
    f(x1, x2, ... , xm) = 0       
 23) 
    h(x1, x2, ... , xm) = p        
 24) 
In general it is hard to solve the above system in integers for x1, x2, ... , xm when m is greater 
than two. 
 Although this key exchange cryptosystem has the intrinsic security mentioned above, it 
requires rather complicated implementation comparing with other key exchange cryptosystems. 
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This complexity is due to generate Diophantine equations used as public keys with 
unpredictable manner lest attackers detect the pattern of their generations. The specifically 
designed program must be implemented in the cryptosystem for that purpose. 
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